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THE CLAIM IS COGNIZABLE BUT THE PETITION IS
UNTIMELY: THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S
RECENT COLLATERAL RELIEF DECISIONS
by THOMAS M. PLACE*
INTRODUCTION
A standard feature of state criminal procedure today is a system of post-
conviction review separate from the right a defendant has to challenge his
conviction or sentence by direct appeal. In the 1950s and 60s, post-conviction
review procedures had developed in response to United States Supreme
Court decisions holding that states must afford prisoners a mechanism for
raising claims that their state court convictions violated constitutionally
protected rights.' Initially, some states judicially construed their writ of
habeas corpus as a means of providing a post-conviction remedy,2 while
others expanded the writ of coram nobis.3 Beginning in the 1950s, other
states enacted comprehensive post-conviction procedures that were either
influenced by the ABA Standards Relating to Post Conviction Remedies 4
which recommended a single, unitary post-conviction remedy or were
modeled after the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.5
Prior to 1966, collateral relief in Pennsylvania was limited to the writ of
habeas corpus6 and, to a lesser extent, the writ of coram nobis.7  The
.Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. This
article benefited from the thoughtful comments of Grace E. D'Alo, Leonard N. Sosnov,
Lawrence E. Norton III, and Judge William H. Platt.
1. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1934); Young v. Regen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Case
v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
2. See e.g. Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963); Ex parte Bush, 313 S.W.2d 287 (1958);
Huffman v. Alexander, 251 P.2d 87 (1952); Sewell v. Lainson, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953).
3. See e.g. People v. Monahan, 217 N.E.2d 664 (1966); In re Chapman, 273 P.2d 817 (1954);
State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court, 95 N.E.2d 556 (1950). See also Richard B.
Amandes, Coram Nobis - Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 Hastings L.J. 48 (1955); Edwin W. Briggs,
Coram Nobis, 17 Mont. L. Rev. 160 (1956).
4. See Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies (ABA 1967).
5. See Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (1955); see e.g. Md. Ann. Code, art. 27
§ 645A-645J; Minn. S.A. § 590.01-590.06 (1967); Mont. C.A. 46-21-101 to 46-21-203; Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 138.510-138.680 (1968). See also Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and
Federal Post Conviction Review, 50 A.B.A. J. 928, 929-30 (1964).
6. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 14. For a discussion of common law habeas corpus in
Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613, 619-23 (Pa. 1965).
7. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Orsino, 178 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 1962) (stating purpose of writ
of coram nobis is to correct errors of fact only); Commonwealth v. Fay, 439 A.2d 1227, 1228-29
(Pa. Super. 1982) (explaining expansion of scope of writ of coram nobis in Pennsylvania to
include matters of law not previously before court); Commonwealth v. Ditmore, 363 A.2d 1253,
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court called for legislation establishing a "process for
hearing and determining alleged violations of federal constitutional
guarantees" in response to a significant increase in the number of post-
conviction challenges in the mid-1960s and the lack of a uniform process to
hear and decide such claims. 8 In 1966, the legislature enacted the Post
Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA").9 The PCHA encompassed habeas
corpus and coram nobis and provided a comprehensive procedure to hear
and decide challenges to convictions obtained and sentences imposed
"without due process of law." 10
In 1988, the PCHA was modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed
the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").' Significant amendments to the
PCRA were enacted in 199512 including the requirement that, subject to
several narrow exceptions, a post-conviction petition must be filed within a
year of the date a defendant's judgment becomes final. 3 As amended,'14 the
PCRA restricts collateral relief to "persons convicted of crimes they did not
commit and persons serving illegal sentences." 15 In contrast to the PCHA,
which permitted a defendant to raise a number of specific constitutional
challenges to his or her conviction or sentence, 6 the PCRA only allows a
court to consider claims of constitutional error that so undermine "the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
1256 (Pa. Super. 1976) (emphasizing traditional limited scope of writ of coram nobis).
8. Myers, 213 A.2d at 619-20.
9. See Pa. Laws 1580, 1580-84 (codified at 19 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 1180-1 to 1180-12, and
recodified as amended at 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 9541-9551(1982)). Sections 9547 to 9551 of the
PCHA were repealed in 1988. See 1988 Pa. Laws 336. The 1988 amendments substituted
"relief" for "hearing" in the statute's title. Id. at § 3. See Elizabeth L. Green, Student Author,
Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post Conviction Hearing Act: Major Pennsylvania Remedies in
Criminal Cases, 39 Temple L.Q. 188, 203-06 (1966) (summarizing changes in habeas corpus law
under PCHA). The current version of the Post Conviction Relief Act is codified at 42 Pa.
Consol. Stat. §§ 9541-46 (1998).
10. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9542 (repealed 1988).
11. See 1988 Pa. Laws 336; 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 9541-46 (West 1988).
12. See 1995 Pa. Laws 1118 (became effective January 16, 1996). The amendments also
established the Capital Unitary Review Act, which replaced post appeal collateral review in
capital cases. On August 11, 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court permanently suspended
Sections 9570 to 9579 of the Capital Unitary Review Act pursuant to its authority under Article
V, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court also suspended Section 9545(c)(3),
relating to limitations periods where a stay of execution is granted, Section 9545(d)(2), relating
to discovery, and the 1995 and 1997 amendments to Section 9546(a) of the PCRA concerning
review of orders in death penalty cases. In Re: Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act and
Related Sections of the Act of 1995-32 (SSI), 722 A.2d 676, 678-79 (Pa. 1999).
13. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b) (West 1998).
14. The Superior Court has rejected challenges to the validity of the 1995 Amendments
based on allegations that the legislation exceeded the scope of the Governor's proclamation of
designated subjects to be addressed during the 1995 Special Session. In doing so, the court
reasoned that the legislature's consideration of the PCRA statute was proper in light of the
Governor's proclamation seeking revisions of the criminal statutes of the Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 743 A.2d 970, 973 (Pa. Super. 1999).
15. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9542 (West 1998) (repealed 1988).
16. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(3) (West 1998) (repealed 1988).
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have taken place."' 7 Furthermore, the PCRA precludes relief for claims that
have been previously litigated on direct appeal or raised in a previously filed
post-conviction petition.18 The PCRA also denies relief for claims that have
been waived,19 namely claims that could have been raised at or before trial,
on appeal, or in a prior post-conviction proceeding, but were not.20
This note examines a number of recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions construing the provision of the PCRA that authorizes relief for
violations of the state or federal constitution only where the defendant
establishes that such constitutional violation "undermined the truth
determining process... ."21 In addition, this note discusses decisions
concerning the one-year time-for-filing requirement and its relationship to
habeas corpus. More specifically, Section I considers when lawyer error
undermines "the truth-determining" process. It examines Commonwealth v.
Kimball,2 2 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the PCRA does
not impose a more stringent prejudice requirement than that applicable when
ineffectiveness of counsel is considered on direct appeal.23 Section I argues
that, while the holding in Kimball is correct, the Court used unnecessarily
broad language in seeking to reconcile the tension in the Strickland line of
cases between outcome determination and reliability of the verdict in
determining prejudice.24 The result, this note argues, is that the Pennsylvania
standard for ineffectiveness, both on direct appeal and in a collateral
proceeding, arguably no longer tracks the federal standard because it does
not take into account certain forms of lawyer error that do not undermine the
reliability of the proceeding, even though the result of the proceeding would
have been different but for the lawyer's conduct.25 Section I also discusses a
recent decision holding that counsel's failure to protect the right to direct
appeal implicates the "truth-determining" process entitling a defendant to
collateral relief.26 The section concludes with an argument that lawyer error
that deprives a defendant of discretionary review should likewise entitle a
defendant to collateral relief.27
Section II considers the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction
petition and reviews a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision holding
the time limit to be jurisdictional38 Section II sets out an argument for
construing the time period as a statute of limitations thereby permitting the
late filing of petitions when extraordinary circumstances preclude compliance
17. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(1) (West 1998).
18. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(3) (repealed 1988); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9544(b).
19. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(3) (repealed 1988); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9544(b).
20. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(3) (repealed 1988); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9544(b).
21. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(i).
22. 724 A.2d 326 (1999).
23. See id. at 332.




28. See infra Section II.
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with the one-year time period.29  This note argues that, even as a
jurisdictional bar where extraordinary circumstances prevent the timely filing
of a petition, a court has the inherent power to treat the petition as timely
filed under the nunc pro tunc doctrine.a° In addition, this note argues that
where post-conviction relief is sought to correct an illegal sentence, a court
has authority to grant relief notwithstanding the fact that the post-conviction
petition is not timely filed. 31 Section II further notes the potential conflict
between the time-for-filing requirement as a jurisdictional bar and the court's
recent decision holding that a defendant has an enforceable right to effective
counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.3 2  This note argues that where
counsel's performance in a post-conviction proceeding is raised beyond the
one-year filing period as it will normally be, in order to provide the
defendant a remedy, ineffectiveness of the counsel should be considered an
extraordinary circumstance permitting the late filing of a second or
subsequent petition.33 Finally, Section II examines recent decisions denying
habeas corpus relief where a PCRA petition is not timely filed.34 This note
argues that the time limit acts as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.3 5 By construing the time-for-filing provision as jurisdictional,
the Court precludes consideration of an untimely petition without regard to
the reasons for its untimeliness. Construed in this manner, the one-year
filing requirement is not a "reasonable restriction" on a constitutionally
guaranteed right.
I. THE COURT EXPANDS PCRA RELIEF BY BROADLY DEFINING WHEN A
CLAIM UNDERMINES THE TRUTH-DETERMINING PROCESS
The PCRA limits the grounds upon which post-conviction relief may be
granted. A violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or
laws of the United States will entitle a defendant to relief only when, in the
circumstances of the particular case, the violation so "undermined the truth
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place. '36 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are likewise
limited under the PCRA to claims that counsel's ineffectiveness undermined
"the truth-determining process. '37 Prior to recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions, the "truth-determining process" had been narrowly defined








36. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(i) (West 1998).
37. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (West 1998).
38. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 712 A.2d 288, 289 (Pa. Super. 1998).
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direct appeal,39 on discretionary review,4° and during post-conviction
proceedings. 1 Excluding direct appeal from the "truth determining process"
led the Superior Court to hold that where a defendant claimed counsel's
conduct deprived him of his right to appeal, but did not "affect the
underlying verdict, '42 the defendant could seek relief through a request for
nunc pro tunc outside the framework of the PCRA. With respect to
counsel's performance at trial, a significant question existed as to whether the
PCRA mandated a more demanding standard of prejudice than when lawyer
error was considered on direct appeal.43 It was against this background of
decisions, that narrowed the scope of post-conviction relief and created a
parallel system of review, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertook
review of the cases discussed below.
A. When Lawyer Error Undermines the Truth Determining Process
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated the standard for evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal in
Commonwealth v. Pierce.44  The Pierce Court considered whether its
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Commonwealth ex rel.
Washington v. Maroney4" required a reviewing court to find that counsel's act
or omission prejudiced the defendant as that term was used by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington46.4  Although Maroney
and other decisions suggested that a defendant was prejudiced whenever
counsel acted unreasonably, the Pierce Court concluded that a defendant
claiming ineffectiveness had always been required to demonstrate both
inadequate performance and prejudice in order to obtain relief.48
Accordingly, the Pierce Court held that the standard of ineffectiveness set
out in Strickland and the Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness constitute the
same rule.49
In post-Pierce cases, Pennsylvania courts uniformly considered
ineffectiveness claims presented on direct appeal pursuant to a three-prong
performance and prejudice test. 0 Prongs one and two concern the lawyer's
performance. Under this test, the defendant must establish that the
39. See id.
40. See Commonwealth v. Tanner, 600 A.2d 201, 205 (Pa. Super. 1991).
41. See Commonwealth v. Christy, 656 A.2d 877, 881 (Pa. 1995) (stating that ineffectiveness
of counsel can be basis for post-conviction relief only if the defendant enjoys a constitutional
right to counsel at the proceeding where the claimed ineffectiveness occurred).
42. Lantzy, 712 A.2d at 291.
43. See Commonwealth v. Buehl, 658 A.2d 771,777 (Pa. 1995).
44. 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
45. 235 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1967), overruled, Pierce, 527 A.2d 973.
46. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
47. See Pierce, 527 A.2d at 974.
48. Id. at 976.
49. Id.
50. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 645 A.2d 226, 230 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Rollins, 580 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v. Durst, 559 A.2d 504, 505 (Pa. 1989).
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underlying claim of ineffectiveness has arguable merit51 and that counsel's act
or omission was not reasonably designed to effectuate his client's interest.5 2
The third prong, known as the prejudice prong, requires the defendant to
establish that "but for counsel's act or omission, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. 5 3
As noted, the PCRA requires a defendant seeking relief on grounds of
ineffectiveness of counsel to prove that counsel's act or omission "so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place. '54 Shortly after the enactment of
the PCRA, the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Thomas,55 held that the
provision of the PCRA governing relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of
counsel "is a substantial restriction of the grounds for post-conviction
collateral relief in Pennsylvania. 5 6  A defendant seeking post-conviction
relief on the grounds that counsel was ineffective was required to show more
than "some prejudice" to be entitled to relief.57 Rather, the PCRA, the court
51. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Borders, 560 A.2d 758, 759 (Pa. 1989) (finding arguable merit
to defendant's ineffectiveness claim where counsel ignores evidence that puts in question
credibility of witness); Commonwealth v. Penrose, 669 A.2d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding
arguable merit to defendant's ineffectiveness claim that counsel's failure to object to jury being
permitted to review defendant's written confession during deliberations conflicted with Pa. R.
Crim. P. 1114), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Legg, 669 A.2d 389,
391 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding arguable merit to defendant's ineffectiveness claim where counsel
ignores available and admissible evidence tending to establish a viable defense), rev'd on other
grounds, 711 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Polston, 616 A.2d 669, 680 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(finding arguable merit to defendant's ineffectiveness claim that videotape testimony violated
defendant's right to confront witnesses), appeal denied, 626 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Gainer, 580 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 1990) (finding failure to seek alibi
instruction conflicted with established law), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 856 (Pa. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107, 1114 (Pa. Super. 1990) (finding arguable merit to
defendant's ineffectiveness claim where counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to seek
suppression of a confession where Miranda warnings had not been provided).
52. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 649 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. 1994) (finding counsel's
strategy to concede some points in closing argument while concentrating on more important
issues reasonable), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167,
1173 (Pa. 1994) (finding counsel's decision not to submit voir dire questions on racial bias
reasonable); Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 647 A.2d 915, 923-924 (Pa. Super. 1994) (finding
counsel's strategy to advise the defendant to enter plea where going to trial would have exposed
the defendant to a possible death sentence reasonable), appeal denied, 655 A.2d 509 (Pa. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Cummings, 619 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding trial counsel's
decision to defend on the basis of provocation rather than insanity reasonable where defendant's
confession supported provocation defense), appeal denied, 631 A.2d 1004 (Pa. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 318 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding counsel's decision not
to object to defective guilty plea colloquy reasonable in light of favorable plea bargain);
Commonwealth v. Hart, 565 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 1989) (finding counsel's decision not to
elect alternative jury charge reasonable as charge given could have worked to defendant's
advantage if jury deadlocked on murder verdict), appeal denied, 581 A.2d 569 (Pa. 1990).
53. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
54. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
55. 578 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. 1990).
56. Id. at 425.
57. See id.
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held, required the defendant to prove that counsel's act or omission so
affected the trial itself that the result of the trial is inherently unreliable. 8
In decisions following Thomas, the Superior Court analyzed
ineffectiveness claims presented in post-conviction appeals according to a
"two step '59 process or pursuant to a three-prong standard with a PCRA
element 6° standard. While both tests and the PCRA appear to impose a
more demanding standard than when the ineffectiveness of counsel is raised
on direct appeal, the Superior Court has given relief under the PCRA when
counsel's act or omission would also satisfy the direct appeal standard.61
The question of whether the PCRA requires a defendant to satisfy a
more demanding standard than when ineffectiveness is considered on direct
appeal was initially considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Buehl.62 In Buehl, the three Justices of an evenly divided
Court held that the Pierce/Strickland standard did not govern ineffectiveness
claims raised in a post-conviction proceeding. Rather, those Justices
concluded that the PCRA "renders more stringent the prejudice requirement
which must be satisfied before relief can be granted. '63  This heightened
prejudice, the Justices concluded, served as an "additional substantive
requirement which must be proved" 64 before post-conviction relief could be
granted. The Court found that counsel's failure to request a cautionary
instruction with regard to certain evidence satisfied the Pierce/Strickland
standard because it could not "be said.., different." 65 The Court concluded
that the defendant was nonetheless not entitled to post-conviction relief
because counsel's ineffectiveness did not undermine the reliability of the
verdict given the "overwhelming evidence" of the defendant's guilt.66
58. See id.
59. See Commonwealth v. Grier, 599 A.2d 993, 994 (Pa. Super. 1991) (applying two-step
analysis to petition for post-conviction relief), appeal denied, 607 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 580 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. Super. 1990) (discussing two-step analysis),
appeal denied, 612 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992).
60. See Buehl, 658 A.2d at 777 (stating the test as a three-prong test and added the PCRA
element); Penrose, 669 A.2d at 999 (same), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 1996).
61. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Correa, 664 A.2d 607, 612 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding that no
reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence was possible), appeal denied, 678 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1996);
Thomas, 578 A.2d at 429 (determining that confidence in verdict was undermined);
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. 1990) (stating that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence was possible).
62. 658 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1995).
63. Id. at 777.
64. Id. at 777 n. 5.
65. Id. at 779.
66. Id. at 782, 783. Justice Cappy, joined by then Justice, now Chief Justice Flaherty,
dissented on the basis that there was no substantive difference between the Pierce/Strickland
standard and the language in the PCRA governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The dissent noted that both the Pierce/Strickland standard and the PCRA required a defendant
to prove that counsel's act or omission undermined the reliability of the verdict. The dissent also
argued that a heightened prejudice standard was at odds with a defendant's right to effective
counsel and would create a post-conviction system in which relief is provided to defendants who
establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel on direct appeal but denied to defendants who are
required to seek post-conviction relief because of ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned to the question of the
standard governing post-conviction allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel
in Kimball.67 The Kimball Court reviewed an en banc decision of the
Superior Court holding that the defendant was entitled to post-conviction
relief by reason of counsel's failure to cross-examine a key Commonwealth
witness. The Court reversed the Superior Court's holding that Kimball had
not been denied his right to effective counsel and was, therefore, not entitled
to post-conviction relief. However, Justice Newman, writing for the Court,
declined to follow Buehl and held that the same standard that governs
ineffectiveness claims presented on direct appeal applies where
ineffectiveness is asserted as a basis for post-conviction relief.68
In Kimball, the Court focused initially on the meaning of "prejudice."
The Court noted that in Pierce it had concluded that the Strickland test was
consistent with the definition of prejudice set out in Maroney.69
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that subsequent decisions applying
Pierce had focused not on whether counsel's conduct compromised the
reliability of the proceeding, a central concern of the Court in Strickland, but
on whether the defendant had proven that, but for counsel's conduct, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.70 Citing the United
States Supreme Court's Lockhart v. Fretwell,71 the Court acknowledged that
prejudice under Strickland was not purely outcome determinative but stated
that because the reliability of the adjudication and the probability that
counsel's conduct "caused a different outcome... are concepts so closely
intertwined and commonly rooted in Strickland, '72 it would not treat them as
separate tests for evaluating claims of ineffectiveness. Using broad language,
the Court held that when a defendant in a PCRA proceeding demonstrates
that counsel's conduct has created a reasonable probability that the truth-
determining process was undermined, it follows that "no reliable
adjudication of guilt.. . could have taken place. '73
Turning to the issue of whether the language in the PCRA that requries
a defendant to establish that counsel's conduct "undermined the truth
determining process '74 requires a defendant to meet a more demanding
standard than the Pierce/Strickland test, the Court concluded that "[b]oth the
PCRA language and Pierce reflect two aspects of the same standard," namely
"Strickland's test for determining when counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced
the defendant. '75 The PCRA language, the Court held, simply captures the
reliability of the result language of Strickland while Pierce focused on
counsel.
67. 724 A.2d 326.
68. See id. at 332.
69. See Kimball, 724 A.2d at 330 citing Maroney, 235 A.2d 349.
70. Id.
71. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
72. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 333.
73. Id.
74. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(i).
75. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 332.
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whether, because of counsel's conduct, the "result of the proceeding would
have been different. 7 6  Consequently, the Court held the standard for
evaluating ineffectiveness claims is the same whether the claim is raised on
direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding." To hold otherwise, the
Court stated, would require it "to recognize that the ineffective assistance of
counsel test adopted in Pierce is actually less stringent than the Strickland
standard. ' 7 Such a holding, the Court concluded, would be inconsistent with
the holding of Pierce, which stated that the standard in Pennsylvania for
evaluating ineffective assistance claims is "identical" to that set out in
Strickland.79
In a decision concurring only in the result, Justice Castille argued that in
Fretwell,80 the United States Supreme Court recognized outcome
determination and reliability of the adjudication as "separate concepts" and
that the majority erred in refusing to treat them as such.81  In Justice
Castille's view, the PCRA does not provide relief where counsel's acts or
omissions do not undermine the reliability of the process by which truth is
determined, even though a court may conclude that the outcome of the trial
would have been different but for counsel's conduct. Collateral relief on the
grounds of ineffectiveness, Justice Castille stated, is available only where
counsel's conduct "undermined the reliability of the process by which truth is
ascertained .... "82
1. Analysis of Kimball
In Kimball, the Court resolved the issue that had sharply divided the
Court in Buehl. The Court's decision in Kimball that the PCRA does not
create a separate and more demanding standard for evaluating claims of
ineffectiveness is supported first by the language in Strickland.83 The Kimball
Court's decision is further supported by the unfairness that would result from
interpreting the PCRA as requiring a showing of prejudice beyond that
necessary for relief to be granted when such a claim is presented on direct
appeal. 84 In resolving this issue, the Kimball Court's failure to consider post-
Strickland United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the prejudice
requirement puts in question whether the standard for evaluating
ineffectiveness claims in Pennsylvania today is in fact "identical" to the
Strickland standard.85
76. Id.
77. See id. at 333-36.
78. Id. at 332.
79. See Pierce, 527 A.2d 973.
80. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
81. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 337-39 (Castille, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 339 (Castille, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 332-33.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 332.
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a. Establishing ineffectiveness of counsel under the PCRA
The question the Court in both Buehl and Kimball confronted was
whether the legislature, in requiring a defendant asserting ineffectiveness of
counsel as a basis for post-conviction relief to establish that counsel's conduct
"so undermined the truth determining" 86 that a "reliable adjudication of
guilt"8 could not have taken place, intended the defendant to meet a more
stringent standard than the Pierce/Strickland standard that governs claims of
ineffectiveness considered on direct appeal. As noted, a plurality of the
Buehl Court concluded that while under Pierce/Strickland the result of
Buehl's trial "may have been different" because of counsel's conduct, Buehl
was not entitled to PCRA relief because the adjudication of his guilt was
reliable.88
Central to the Kimball Court's holding that the PCRA does not establish
a separate, more demanding, prejudice test is the textual similarity between
the language in section 9543(a)(2)(ii) of the PCRA and United States
Supreme Court's discussion of prejudice in Strickland. The PCRA authorizes
relief where the defendant establishes that counsel's conduct "so
undermined" the process "that no reliable adjudication of guilt... could
have taken place." 89  In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized the central of role of reliability of the verdict in evaluating a
claim of ineffectiveness. 90 The purpose of right to counsel, the Court stated,
is to "ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
on the outcome of the proceeding."91 The "benchmark," according to the
Court, for judging a claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct "so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 92  Specifically
addressing the defendant's burden of establishing that counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, the Court held that the defendant must
show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
86. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(a)(2)(ii).
87. Id.
88. Buehl, 658 A.2d at 779.
89. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
90. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92.
91. Id. The Strickland test has been subject to much criticism. Justice Blackmun noted,
"Ten years after the articulation of that standard, practical experience establishes that the
Strickland test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to be represented by
something more than 'a person who happens to be a lawyer."' McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S.
1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685). See also
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal Practical Undermining of the
Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 91 (1995); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994);
Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 59 (1986); Richard Klein, The Emperor
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. (1986).
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. ' 93 According to Strickland, a
defendant establishes the unreliability of the proceeding by showing a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." 94  The Court
emphasized that unless a defendant established both deficient performance
and prejudice, it could not be concluded that the verdict resulted from a
"breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." 95
According to Kimball, the language of the PCRA, with its emphasis on the
reliability of the adjudication of guilt, tracks the Strickland definition of
prejudice. 96 The Kimball court thus interpreted Strickland as requiring that a
defendant alleging ineffectiveness under the PCRA must establish acts or
omissions by counsel that "undermined" the reliability of the adjudication of
guilt. 97
Kimball held that there is a single standard in Pennsylvania to review
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel whether such claims are raised on direct
appeal or on collateral review. 98 Contrary to Justice Castille's dissent in
Kimball,99 this holding is not in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's post-Strickland decision in Fretwell.1°° In Fretwell, as discussed more
fully below, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Strickland
standard does not identify prejudice based solely on outcome, but instead
considers whether counsel's deficient performance renders the proceeding
unreliable. 101 The Court held that where counsel's error did not deprive the
defendant of any substitute or procedural right to which the law entitles him,
the defendant does not suffer prejudice even though the result of the
proceeding would have been different but for counsel's deficient
performance. 1 2 The Fretwell Court, as Kimball noted, stated that it was not
deviating from Strickland in focusing on reliability of the proceeding in
determining whether a defendant is prejudiced by counsel's mistake. 103
Finally, in addition to the unfairness Kimball noted would result if the
PCRA standard of prejudice was deemed more demanding than the standard
on direct appeal, the Court in Strickland specifically rejected "special
standards" for claims of ineffectiveness presented in collateral proceedings. 1°4
Although Strickland considered the issue in the context of federal habeas
corpus, the Court's reasoning can be applied to state collateral proceedings
such as the PCRA 0 5 The "principles governing ineffectiveness claims," the
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id. at 694.
95. Id. at 687.
96. See Kimball, 724 A.2d at 332.
97. Id. at 333.
98. See id. at 332.
99. See id. at 338 (Castile, J., dissenting).
100. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 369 n. 2.
104. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
105. Id.
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Court stated, "should apply in... collateral proceedings as they do on direct
appeal" because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "is an attack on
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged.' 16
Moreover, application of a more demanding standard of prejudice in a state
collateral proceeding than that required by Strickland, which results in the
denial of a claim of ineffectiveness that otherwise satisfies the Strickland
standard, would arguably entitle the defendant to federal habeas corpus
relief. The defendant would be entitled to habeas corpus relief because such
a decision would be "contrary to," or involve an "unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States .... 107 Because no valid purpose is served by denying
state collateral relief to a defendant who is entitled to federal habeas corpus
relief, the Court in Kimball correctly concluded that the PCRA does not
require a defendant to satisfy a standard of prejudice that is more
demanding than that articulated in Strickland when relief is sought on the
basis of ineffectiveness of counsel.
b. Kimball and the meaning of prejudice
The Court's holding in Kimball, determining that the PCRA mirrors the
reliability language of Strickland, required the court to conclude that there is
no difference between the PCRA and the standard that governs the
consideration of ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. The Court noted
that to hold otherwise, would require it to recognize that the standard
adopted in Pierce was, in fact, less demanding than the Strickland standard. 10 8
The Court stated it was precluded from reaching that conclusion because
Pierce expressly recognized that the standard for evaluating claims of
ineffectiveness on direct appeal is "identical" to the Strickland standard. 1°9
But the Court's holding in Kimball, finding that where a defendant on direct
appeal or in a post conviction proceeding demonstrates that counsel's
deficient performance has created a "reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different, then no reliable
adjudication of guilt... could have taken place,"" 0 does not take into
account post-Strickland United States Supreme Court decisions holding that
with respect to certain types of lawyer error, the proceeding is not unreliable
106. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. 2000). In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the
Supreme Court described the Strickland prejudice standard as less demanding than the
preponderance standard. "[A] defendant need not establish that the attorney's deficient
performance more likely than not altered the outcome in order to establish prejudice under
Strickland ..... Id. at 175. In Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir.
1999), the Third Circuit held that while Congress intended federal habeas corpus courts to defer
to reasonable state court adjudications, habeas corpus relief is warranted where the "state court
decision.., resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme
Court precedent."
108. See Kimball, 724 A.2d at 332.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 333.
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where the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the
lawyer's conduct. As a result, it can be argued that the standard for
evaluating ineffectiveness claims in Pennsylvania is no longer identical to
Strickland.
In Strickland, the Court set out an outcome test in order to determine
whether lawyer error compromised the reliability of the proceeding. Under
Strickland, except in limited circumstances where prejudice is presumed, a
defendant must prove that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.""11  A reasonable probability, the Court noted, "is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"" 2 of the proceeding. The
Court qualified the outcome test by excluding from the assessment of the
likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant the possibility of
"arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, [or] 'nullification'... 11 3 because the Court
held a defendant is not entitled to "the luck of a lawless decisionmaker. 114
The assessment of prejudice, the Court stated, "should proceed on the
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. 115
In two cases since Strickland, the Court has addressed the prejudice
prong of the Strickland standard. In Nix v. Whiteside,11 6 the Court concluded
that the defendant had not been prejudiced by counsel's actions in response
to threatened perjury by the defendant.117 Counsel in Nix, upon learning that
the defendant intended to commit perjury, warned the defendant that such
action would, among other things, require counsel to inform the court of the
perjury.11 8 The defendant subsequently testified without perjuring himself
but later claimed that counsel's warning had deprived him of his right to
effective assistance of counsel." 9 The Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant failed to satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of
Strickland. 20
Chief Justice Burger's discussion of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by counsel's actions begins by noting the language in Strickland
that in judging the likelihood of a different outcome, the defendant has no
entitlement to the "luck of a lawless decisionmaker.1' 21 Even if the jury
might have believed the defendant's perjurious testimony, the Court held
that the defendant had "no valid claim that confidence in the result of his
111. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 695.
114. Id.
115. Id.





121. Id. at 175 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
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trial has been diminished by his desisting from the contemplated perjury '122
because the defendant's "truthful testimony could not have prejudiced the
result of his trial .... -123 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated
that the defendant was not prejudiced because he was neither deprived of a
fair trial nor denied the opportunity to assert rights guaranteeing a fair
trial. 124
In Fretwell, the Court returned to the meaning of prejudice, holding
specifically that Strickland did not establish a purely outcome determinative
test in evaluating whether deficient lawyer performance denied the
defendant his right to effective counsel. In Fretwell, counsel at the capital
sentencing proceeding failed to object to the jury's consideration of an
aggravating factor - pecuniary gain - that had already been considered
when the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the course of
robbery. 125  Under then existing Eighth Circuit precedent, such double
counting was unconstitutional and had counsel made the objection, the
defendant would have been sentenced to life imprisonment. 126 By the time
defendant raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the precedent
which held double counting unconstitutional had been overruled. 27 Even
though the state conceded that counsel's performance was deficient' 28 and
did not dispute the lower court's holding that the defendant would not have
been sentenced to death if a timely objection had been made, the Court held
that "[s]heer outcome determination [is] not sufficient to make out a claim
under the Sixth Amendment.1' 29 According to the Court, prejudice under
Strickland requires consideration of whether counsel's deficient performance
renders the "result of trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally
unfair. ' 130 The Court held that a proceeding is neither unreliable or unfair if
counsel's error does not "deprive the defendant of any substantive or
procedural right to which the law entitles him. '13' In Fretwell, the Court
concluded that the sentencing proceeding was neither unfair nor unreliable
because given the change of law, the defendant was not entitled to the
objection his lawyer failed to make.1 32
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, the author of Strickland,
noted that in Strickland, the Court recognized that certain factors could not
be considered in assessing prejudice. 33  Justice O'Connor characterized
Fretwell as a case like Nix, in which the Court identified an additional factor,
122. Id.
123. Id. at 176.
124. Id. at 186-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369 n. 1.
126. See id. at 368.
127. See Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), overruled, Perry v. Lockhart, 871
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989).
128. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369 n. 1.
129. Nix, 475 U.S. at 175-76 (1986).
130. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
131. Id. at 372.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 373.
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namely the effect of an objection the court, in assessing prejudice, knows to
be meritless under current law, cannot be taken into account in determining
whether counsel's conduct prejudiced the defendant. 13
The post-Strickland United States Supreme Court cases make clear that
the prejudice requirement of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not
purely an outcome determination test. Strickland recognized that the
prejudice standard was not solely outcome based by holding that certain so-
called "lawless" conduct of the decisionmaker could not be considered in
assessing whether the result of the proceeding would have been different
because to do so would produce an unjust result. 35 Nix and Fretwell do not
replace Strickland's outcome test with a reliability of the adjudication
standard. Rather, the cases add to the list of factors that courts cannot
consider in determining whether counsel's conduct prejudiced the defendant.
In both cases, the Court held that the claimed error by counsel did not
prejudice the defendant because, analogous to the "lawless
decisionmaker,"'136 to factor such act or omission would produce an unjust
result - a "windfall." 137
In light of Nix and Fretwell, the majority in Kimball erred in concluding
that whenever a defendant meets the outcome determination test, "no
reliable adjudication of guilt could have taken place. '138 The holding fails to
take into account language in post-Strickland decisions that an analysis of
lawyer error that focuses "solely on mere outcome determination" is
"defective.' 1 39 The post-Strickland Supreme Court cases discussed above
establish that lawyer errors that do not deprive the defendant of any
"substantive or procedural right,"1 0 which the defendant is entitled to under
the law, cannot be a factor in assessing prejudice even though the result of
the proceeding would have been different but for the lawyer's conduct.
Because Kimball concluded that a proceeding is unreliable where there is a
reasonable probability that lawyer error changed the outcome of the
proceeding, 141 the test for evaluating claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in
Pennsylvania is less demanding than the Strickland test and in conflict with
the Pierce Court's holding that the Pennsylvania standard for ineffectiveness
claims is "identical" to Strickland.142
B. Direct Appeal as Implicating the Truth Determining Process
The question of whether lawyer errors that occur following conviction
are cognizable under the PCRA was initially considered by the Superior
134. Id. at 374-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669.
136. Id. at 695.
137. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370.
138. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 333.
139. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369.
140. Id. at 372.
141. See Kimball, 724 A.2d at 333.
142. See Pierce, 527 A.2d at 976-77.
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Court in the context of appellate counsel's failure to inform defendant of his
right to seek discretionary review. In Commonwealth v. Tanner,143 the Court
held that an ineffectiveness claim under the PCRA must raise the question of
whether an "innocent individual" has been convicted. 144  The Court
concluded that because counsel's claimed ineffectiveness did not bear on the
defendant's "ultimate guilt or innocence, ' 145 counsel's error did not implicate
the "truth determining process" and, therefore, defendant was not entitled to
relief under the PCRA.
The rationale of Tanner was relied upon by the Superior Court in
holding that a defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief where
counsel fails to preserve his right to direct appeal. In Commonwealth v.
Petroski,146 the Court held that a defendant claiming ineffectiveness of
counsel was required to establish innocence in order to be entitled to post-
conviction relief.147 Finding that defendant's petition contained no averment
that counsel's failure to appeal "undermined the truth determining
process"' 48 or prevented a "reliable determination of guilt or innocence ''149
the Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Nor could such a
claim be made, the Court noted, because the truth determining process
occurs during trial and "[m]atters occurring after judgment ... cannot
determine what has occurred before."' 150 In denying relief under the PCRA,
the Court stated it was not deciding whether the defendant was entitled to
seek relief under some other procedure. 51
The issue of a defendant's entitlement to post-conviction relief where
counsel fails to protect the right to direct appeal was considered by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lantzy. 15 2 In Lantzy, the
Court reviewed an en banc decision of the Superior Court in which the
Court, seeking to clarify Petroski, noted that ineffectiveness of counsel with
respect to protecting a defendant's right to direct appeal "may well affect the
truth determining process .... 1 53 and, therefore, such a defendant is not
143. 600 A.2d 201 (Pa. Super. 1991).
144. Id. at 205.
145. Id.
146. 695 A.2d 844 (Pa. Super. 1997).
147. See id. at 846.
148. Id. at 847.
149. Id.
150. Id. Prior to Petroski, where a defendant established that he requested counsel to file a
direct appeal and counsel disregarded the request, the defendant was granted post-conviction
relief in form of an appeal nunc pro tunc without requiring the defendant to establish that, had
an appeal been taken, the appellate court would have granted the requested relief. While this
approach to ineffectiveness developed under the PCHA, it had been applied by the Superior
Court to claims of ineffectiveness under the PCRA. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 561
A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. 1989) (where PCRA court concluded that when defendant has been denied
his or her right to direct appeal, the PCRA court should grant the defendant leave to file a direct
appeal nunc pro tunc).
151. See id.
152. 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
153. Lantzy, 712 A.2d at 291.
[Vol. 10:49
"always ineligible for relief under the PCRA. '' 5 4  The defendant, the
Superior Court held, was not entitled to post-conviction relief because he had
failed to prove that counsel's conduct compromised the truth determining
process.155 In dicta, the Court noted that where a defendant asserts that
counsel's ineffectiveness deprived him of a right to appeal "causing him
prejudice but not affecting the underlying verdict or adjudication," the
defendant can seek relief outside the PCRA by requesting an appeal nunc
pro tunc.
156
In reversing the Superior Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the PCRA provides the "exclusive remedy"'57 where a defendant seeks
the restoration of appeal rights due to counsel's failure to perfect a direct
appeal. Relying upon its recent holding in Commonwealth v. Chester5 8 that
claims arising during the penalty phase of a capital case are cognizable under
the PCRA, the Court recognized that a narrow interpretation of the PCRA,
applying only to claims directly implicating the reliability of the adjudication
of guilt, would lead to a bifurcated system of review whereby claims
considered outside the PCRA would be subject to habeas corpus review. In
light of the language of section 9542 of the PCRA, which states that the
PCRA is intended to provide the "sole means" for obtaining collateral relief,
the Court concluded the legislature intended that all post-conviction claims
that would otherwise qualify for habeas corpus review be considered within
the framework of the PCRA.15 9 Referring to its decision in Kimball, the
Court rejected the Superior Court's interpretation of section 9543(a)(2)(ii)
governing ineffectiveness claims as requiring a defendant to plead and prove
innocence to be entitled to relief. 6' The "truth determining" language of the
PCRA, the Court held, is the "equivalent to the prejudice requirement
applied by the federal courts to both direct and collateral review under
Strickland. ... "161 Under Strickland, the Court noted prejudice is presumed
when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel. 62 Consequently,
where counsel disregards a defendant's request to file a direct appeal, the
defendant is entitled to PCRA relief without establishing either innocence or
demonstrating the merits of the issues that would have been raised on
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. In a dissenting opinion, President Judge McEwen argued that where counsel deprives
a defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a direct appeal, the claim is cognizable
under the PCRA, regardless of the nature of merits of the issues the defendant seeks to raise on
appeal. The dissent was also of the opinion that the majority's suggestion that defendant who
had been denied the right to direct appeal had a remedy outside the PCRA, presumably by
seeking habeas corpus, would impose burdens on trial courts because habeas corpus, unlike the
PCRA, does not provide provisions for the prompt disposition of petition which are clearly
meritless.
157. See Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 570.
158. 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999).
159. Id. at 1250-51.
160. See Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 570.
161. Id. at 571.
162. See id.
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appeal. 16
3
The rationale of Lantzy supports granting a defendant post-conviction
relief to reinstate the right to seek discretionary review in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that was lost due to counsel's ineffectiveness. 164 Central to
the Superior Court's decision in Tanner denying the defendant PCRA relief
was the interpretation of the PCRA rejected by the Court in Lantzy and
Kimball, namely that an ineffectiveness claim must raise a question of
whether an innocent person has been convicted.
Although counsel on discretionary review, unlike direct appeal, 165 is not
constitutionally guaranteed, 166 Rule 316 of the Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
"guarantee ... that a person seeking allowance of appeal is entitled to the
assistance of counsel."'167 When counsel is appointed to represent an indigent
defendant in a first PCRA proceeding, Rule 1504 provides the defendant
with representation "throughout the.., proceedings, including any appeal"
in the matter.168 Recently, as discussed below, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a defendant has an "enforceable right to effective post-
conviction counsel. '169 Because the Court has extended post-conviction
relief to defendants where counsel, although not required by the federal or
state constitution, was ineffective, post-conviction relief should be available
where counsel, appointed pursuant to either Rule 314 or Rule 1504 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, failed to advise a defendant of his
right to seek discretionary review.
The need for a remedy in such a case has been made more compelling by
the United States Supreme Court's recent decision holding that federal
habeas corpus review is not available where a defendant did not seek
discretionary review in the state court of last resort.170 Federal habeas corpus
assures that state court adjudications of federally guaranteed rights are not
"contrary to," or involve "an unreasonable application of clearly established
163. See id.
164. See Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 89 (3d Cir. 1999) (counsel failed to notify defendant of the
Superior Court's decision affirming the denial of post-conviction relief until after the time to
seek discretionary review had elapsed).
165. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Pa. Const. art. § 9.
166. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 600 (1974); Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 595 A.2d 1254,
1257 (Pa. Super. 1991) ("Review by the Supreme Court following Superior Court review is not
constitutionally guaranteed.").
167. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 420 A.2d 1323, 1323 (Pa. 1980). See also Commonwealth v.
West, 482 A.2d 1339, 1343 (Pa. Super. 1984).
168. Pa. R. Crim. P. 1504 (2000). See also Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 415 A.2d 65, 68 n.2
(Pa. 1980) (stating right to counsel extends to appeal from PCHA hearings); Commonwealth v.
Cooney, 266 A.2d 650, 651 (Pa. 1970) (holding that defendant's appointment of counsel did not
end with an adverse determination); Commonwealth v. Walters, 244 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. 1968)
(stating that defendant's right to counsel includes counsel on appeal).
169. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998). Although Albrecht was
decided in the context of a first petition, its rationale arguably applies whenever counsel is
appointed pursuant to Rule 1504.
170. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
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federal law. ' 171 Therefore, habeas corpus review should not be foreclosed
because of lawyer error.
II. THE COURT LIMITS PCRA RELIEF BY NARROWLY CONSTRUING THE
TIME FOR FILING REQUIREMENT
Prior to the 1995 amendments, the PCRA did not require a defendant to
file a petition for post-conviction relief within a specified period following a
guilty plea, conviction, or direct appeal. Rather, section 9543(b) authorized a
court to dismiss a petition if, because of delay in the petition filing, the
prosecution had been prejudiced in its ability either to respond to the
petition or to retry the defendant. 172
As a result of the 1995 amendments to the Act, section 9545(b) now
requires, with few exceptions, that a post-conviction petition, including a
second or subsequent petition, be filed within one-year of the judgment
becoming final.173 A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of the time to seek
such review.17 4  The one-year period does not apply if the defendant
establishes interference by a government official with the presentation of the
claim. 17 5 Nor does the period apply if the defendant pleads and proves that
the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to the defendant,17 6 or
that the claim asserted is a constitutional right recognized after the time
period and is to be applied retroactively.'77  Under the amendments,
"government official" does not include defense counsel, appointed or
retained. 7 8 A petition claiming one of the exceptions must be filed "within
60 days of the time the claim could have been presented."' 17 9 Although a
171. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) (Supp. 11, 1998).
172. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(b) (West 1998); Commonwealth v. Young, 695 A.2d 414,
420-21 (Pa. Super. 1997).
173. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b)(1) (West 1998).
174. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b)(3) (West 1998). Where a defendant's sentence became
final more than a year prior to the effective date of the 1995 amendments, a grace period
allowed a first petition to be filed within one year of the effective date of the amendments. Act
of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1118, No. 32 (Spec. Sess. No. 1, § 3(1)). See Thomas, 718 A.2d at 329
(Pa. Super. 1998) ("[I]t was the intention of the legislature to permit an otherwise untimely first
PCRA petition to be filed within one year following the effective date of the 1995 PCRA
amendments, but that exception was not intended to apply to subsequent petitions regardless of
when a first petition was filed"); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 718 A.2d 1262, 1263 (Pa. Super. 1998),
appeal denied, 737 A.2d 1224 (1999)(petition seeking post-conviction relief, which results in the
granting of a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, is not a prior petition for purposes of the one-year
exception). A petition seeking post conviction relief that merely results in the granting of an
appeal nunc pro tunc is not a prior petition for purposes of the one-year exception pursuant to
the Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1118, No. 32 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 3(a).
175. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (West 1998).
176. See 42 Pa. ConsoL Stat. 9545(b)(1)(ii) (West 1998).
177. See 42 Pa. ConsoL Stat. 9545(b)(1)(iii) (West 1998).
178. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b)(4) (West 1998).
179. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b)(2) (West 1998).
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petition appears untimely on its face, if it is defendant's first petition, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the PCRA court must appoint
counsel if the defendant is indigent. 180 A defendant has a right to appeal the
decision of the PCRA court dismissing a petition as untimely under the 1995
amendments. 181
A. The Nature of the One-Year Filing Requirement
Whether a PCRA court has authority to consider an untimely petition
where the defendant does not establish a statutory exception to the one-year
period has been addressed in several recent decisions. The issue of timeliness
under the 1995 amendments was first considered by the Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Hall.182 In Hall, the Court accepted an appeal where the
lower court had found defendant's PCRA petition untimely but granted
defendant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc outside the PCRA. Although not
stated in the decision, counsel had apparently failed to protect the
defendant's right to direct appeal. Stating the issue as whether the time-for-
filing requirement in section 9545(b) may be overridden by a grant of a right
to appeal nunc pro tunc, the Court, acknowledging that section 9542 provides
that the PCRA is the "sole means" for seeking collateral relief, nonetheless
found support for accepting the appeal.' 83 The Court relied on both its prior
decisions' 84  and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Stock,'8' which held that in extraordinary circumstances,
where the right to appeal was denied, an appeal nunc pro tunc should be
allowed.
Since Hall, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically addressed
the nature of the one-year limitation. In Commonwealth v. Peterkin,86 the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the one-year filing
requirement. 87  The Court initially concluded that the 1995 amendments
require "as a matter of jurisdiction" that a PCRA petition be filed within
one-year of final judgment.188  The Court offered no support for its
conclusion that the time limit was jurisdictional other than citing the
statute. 89 The Court noted its decision in Stock but stated that it found
"nothing in Peterkin's circumstances which would bring him within this
rule." 19  The Court went on to hold that because the time limit is
180. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 721 A.2d 380, 382 (Pa. Super. 1998).
181. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 716 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa. Super. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Austin, 721 A.2d 375, 377 (Pa. Super. 1998).
182. 713 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. 1998).
183. See id. at 651.
184. See In re A.P., 617 A.2d 764 (Pa. Super. 1992), affd, 639 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 1994);
Lantzy, 712 A.2d 288 (Pa. Super. 1998), rev'd, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
185. 679 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1996).
186. 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998).
187. See id. at 654.
188. Id. at 641.
189. See id. at 654-55.
190. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643 n.7.
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"sufficiently generous" and that there are exceptions to the time limit, the
one-year time limit does not violate due process or unconstitutionally restrict
the right to seek habeas corpus relief guaranteed by the Pennsylvania
Constitution.19'
In Commonwealth v. Fahy,192 the Court rejected an argument that the
time limitations mandated by the 1995 amendments were subject to equitable
tolling.' 93 The court held that because the time limitations are jurisdictional
and, therefore, mandatory, the period for filing a PCRA petition "is not
subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling"' 94 except to the extent the
doctrine is reflected in the statutory exceptions. The Court further held that
a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely
PCRA petition. 195 Additionally, a court cannot consider a challenge to the
legality of a sentence if the petition is not timely filed or does not fall under
one of the exceptions. 96 In Fahy, like Peterkin, the Court offered no support
for its conclusion that the time limitation is jurisdictional other than stating
that the "General Assembly amended the PCRA to require, as a matter of
jurisdiction, that all petitions must be filed within a certain period of time
after judgment."' 97
A time-for-filing provision may constitute a mandatory condition upon
the availability of a judicial remedy and, therefore, serve as a jurisdictional
bar or it may act as a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. 98 In
contrast to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Peterkin and Fahy,
courts regularly undertake an analysis of a time limitation by considering
legislative history, case law, and the purposes underlying the statute to
determine the legislature's intent. 199 Such careful analysis is mandated by the
Statutory Construction Act, which requires a clear showing of legislative
intent in concluding that subsequent legislation limits a court's jurisdiction.200
The language and structure of the PCRA does not by itself establish that
the legislature intended the one-year period to act as a bar to the jurisdiction
of the PCRA court. The provision conferring original jurisdiction in a PCRA
proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas and the time limit provision are
191. Id. at 643. The applicable section in the Pennsylvania Constitution is Pa. Const. art. I, §
14.
192. 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).
193. See id. at 222-23.
194. Id. at 222.
195. See id. at 223.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 217-18.
198. See e.g. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478-79 (1986); Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1982); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 338 (1976);
Shendock v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458, 1461-66 (3d Cir. 1990).
199. See e.g. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 392-93; Miller v. N.J. State Dep't. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616,
617-18 (3d Cir. 1998); Smith v. Commonwealth, W.C.A.B., 670 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Pa. 1996).
200. See 1 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 1928(b)(7) (West 1998). See e.g. Jones v. W.C.A.B. (Midland-
Ross), 612 A.2d 570, 573 (Pa. Commw. 1992), affd, 645 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1994); In re Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 398 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. Super. 1979), affd, 412 A.2d 1099 (Pa. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Barfod, 50 A.2d 36, 39 (Pa. Super. 1946).
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not set out in separate sections of the statute.210 However, section 9545 of the
PCRA entitled "Jurisdiction & Proceedings" clearly separates jurisdiction in
subsection (a) entitled "Original Jurisdiction" from the time limits contained
in subsection (b) entitled "Time for filing petition." 2°2 The term jurisdiction
only appears in subsection (a) and the remaining subsections including (b)
time limits, (c) stay of executions, and (d) evidentiary hearings are arguably
the "proceedings" referred to in the heading of the section. Moreover, the
three exceptions to the filing period in section 9545(b)(1) are similar to
provisions found in statute of limitations in Pennsylvania 23 and suggest an
interpretation of the time-for-filing period as a statute of limitations.
Although the legislative history of the 1995 amendments is sparse, it
supports the view that the time-for-filing period is non-jurisdictional. In
addressing the exceptions that excuse non-compliance with the one-year
period, Senator Greenleaf, one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 amendments,
characterized the one-year filing period as a "statute of limitations. '" 204
Construing the one-year filing period as a statute of limitations subject
to equitable tolling is consistent with the Court's finding in Peterkin that the
General Assembly, in enacting the 1995 amendments to the PCRA, intended
that "PCRA petitions are to be accorded finality. '205  As a statute of
limitations, the one-year period contributes to finality by greatly speeding up
the process of collateral review while at the same time permitting courts to
equitably toll the time period in extraordinary cases where application of the
time period would be unfair. Moreover, an interpretation of the time period
as a statute of limitations is consistent with the provision of the PCRA that
precludes a court from entertaining a request for any form of relief in
anticipation of the filing of a petition under the PCRA.206 As a result, unlike
filing a direct appeal where the responsibility of complying with thirty-day
time period is in most cases the responsibility of counsel,20 7 an indigent
defendant does not have a right to appointed counsel in a non-capital PCRA
201. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (West 1999) (one-year period of limitation on filing of
federal habeas corpus petition); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (West 1994) (jurisdictional provision of the
federal habeas corpus statute). The one-year time period governing the filing of a federal
habeas corpus petition that became effective as part of the amendments to the habeas corpus
statute under the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 has been construed by
federal courts to be a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. See Calderon v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998); Miller, 145
F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998).
202. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545 (West 1998).
203. See e.g. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 5522, 5552 (West Supp. 1998); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5553
(West Supp. 1999).
204. Legislative Journal-Senate, 1" Special Sess. 1995, p. 214 (Statement of Senator
Greenleaf). In a post-Peterkin but pre-Fahy decision, the Superior Court specifically referred to
the one-year time period as a "statute of limitations." Commonwealth v. DeHart, 730 A.2d 991,
994 (Pa. Super. 1999).
205. Peterken, 722 A.2d at 642.
206. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545.
207. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5571 (West 1998); Kimball, 724 A.2d 326; Commonwealth v.
Wilkerson, 416 A.2d 477,479 (Pa. 1980); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1992).
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proceeding until a petition is filed. 2°s  Consequently, the incarcerated
defendant is responsible for the preparation and timely filing of the
petition.209 As the United States Supreme Court noted, construing a time-
for-filing provision as jurisdictional is "particularly inappropriate in a
statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the
process.
'210
Even if the Court in Peterkin and Fahy is correct that the time period in
section 9545(b) is jurisdictional, there is a substantial body of case law in
Pennsylvania holding that time limits that are jurisdictional are subject to
equitable exceptions. Courts have long permitted appeals nunc pro tunc
where non-negligent conduct 211 or "something more than mere hardship" 212
prevented compliance with the filing period. "Appeal nunc pro tunc is
intended as a remedy to vindicate the right to an appeal where that right has
been lost due to certain extraordinary circumstances. '21 3 As an example, in
Stock, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that where the defendant
requested counsel to file an appeal in a summary case and counsel failed to
act, counsel's failure constituted an extraordinary circumstance that merited
the remedy of an appeal nunc pro tunc, even though the defendant did not
have a right to counsel in a summary case.
The rule adopted in the "prisoner mailbox" cases is another example of
courts recognizing the unfairness that would result in strict application of
time-for-filing requirements. In Commonwealth v. Jones,214 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that where a pro se defendant files a direct appeal from
the denial of PCRA relief, the appeal is deemed filed on the date when the
prisoner deposits the appeal with prison officials or places it in the prison
mailbox regardless of when it actually reaches the court.215 In adopting the
rule, the Court recognized the unique "situation of prisoners seeking to
208. Pa. R. Crim. P. 1504 (West 1989). In capital cases, pursuant to Pa R. Crim. P. 1504(f), the
trial court will appoint PCRA counsel at the conclusion of direct review unless the defendant
waives PCRA review, elects to proceed pro se or be represented by original trial or direct appeal
counsel.
209. To be eligible for PCRA relief, the defendant must be in custody at the time relief is
granted. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9543(a)(1) (West 1998). E.g. Pierce, 579 A.2d 963; Ahltorn, 683
A.2d 632.
210. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397 (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
211. See e.g. Cook v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 671 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Pa. 1996)
(explaining that court may allow appeal nunc pro tunc where appeal is not timely because of
non-negligent circumstances as they relate to appellant or counsel); Bass v. Commonwealth, 401
A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 1979) (stating that appeal nunc pro tunc permitted where appeal is untimely
because of non-negligent conduct of attorney or staff). See McKeon County Animal Hosp. v.
Burdick, 700 A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. Super. 1997); Tarlo v. Univ. of Pitt., 443 A.2d 879, 880 (Pa.
Cmmw. 1982).
212. Schrenkensen v. Kishbaugh, 29 A. 284, 285 (Pa. 1894).
213. Stock, 679 A.2d at 764.
214. 700 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1997).
215. See id. at 426. In Jones, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded its ruling in Smith v.
Board of Probation & Parole, 683 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa. 1996), which applied the "prisoner mailbox
rule" to appeals from court orders pursuant to Pa. R. App. 1514.
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appeal without the aid of counsel. 2 16 The Superior Court, relying on Jones,
recently held that the "prisoner mailbox rule" applies to the filing of a pro se
PCRA petition.217 Using the language of equitable tolling, the Court stated
that while section 9545(b)(1) permits a court to accept an untimely petition
where there has been unconstitutional interference by government officials,
delay by "prison personnel ... even if it does not rise to unconstitutional
interference, may unfairly limit a prisoner's right to file. ' '218
The nunc pro tunc doctrine and the "prisoner mailbox rule" are judicial
acknowledgments that unfairness may result from strict application of
statutorily mandated time periods. The same concern about unfairness
should apply to indigent defendants seeking PCRA relief. By determining
that the time for filing a PCRA petition was not subject to equitable
tolling,219 the Court singles out one class of litigants to whom the Court may
not consider the injustice that can result from a strict application of
statutorily mandated time periods. Circumstances that could prevent an
incarcerated defendant from complying with the statute's one-year limitation
include physical or mental disability, lack of access to legal materials, and any
change in an institution's normal routine. Unless Pennsylvania is prepared to
close the door on all litigants who fail to meet mandatory time limits, PCRA
courts should be permitted to consider an untimely petition when
circumstances beyond a defendant's control make it impossible to file the
petition on time.
In addition, the holding in Fahy that an ineffective counsel claim will not
"save an otherwise untimely petition '220 poses a potential conflict with recent
decisions addressing the issue of whether a defendant has a right to effective
representation in a post-conviction proceeding. For instance, the Court in
Commonwealth v. Privolos,221 noting that counsel was appointed pursuant to
Pa. R. Crim. P. 1504(a), stated that although it had not decided whether a
defendant had a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to effective
counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, it had previously recognized that
counsel must "discharge the responsibilities under the rule and that a remedy
may be fashioned where counsel fails to do so. ''222 In Commonwealth v.
Albrecht,223 the Court returned to the issue of whether a defendant has a right
to effective representation in a post-conviction proceeding. Relying upon its
holding in Commonwealth v. Albert,2 4 the Court stated that its power to
"review, and if necessary, remedy the deficiencies of counsel at the post-
conviction stage" was not "circumscribed by the parameters of the Sixth
216. Jones, 700 A.2d at 425 (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988)).
217. Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 1998).
218. Id. at 1289.
219. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222.
220. Id. at 223.
221. 715 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1998).
222. Id. at 422 (citing Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 415 A.2d 65, 68-69 (Pa. 1980)).
223. 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998).
224. 561 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1989).
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Amendment. ' 25  The Court held that Pa. R. Crim. P. 1504 "requires an
enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel. 12 26 When a defendant
is represented by new counsel on appeal and the former counsel failed to
raise particular claims in the PCRA court, an appellate court under Albrecht
will grant relief where the defendant establishes that post-conviction counsel
rendered ineffective assistance.
Compliance with the one-year filing period is likely to arise as an issue
where a defendant is represented on appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief by the same counsel who represented him at the PCRA
proceeding. In such a case, it is unlikely that counsel will raise his own
ineffectiveness as part of the appeal from the denial of post-conviction
relief.227 If PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness is raised, it will be raised in a
second or subsequent PCRA petition which will, in almost all cases, be filed
beyond the one-year period.2m The same issue might also arise if PCRA
counsel fails to provide effective assistance of counsel on appeal from the
denial of PCRA relief.2 29 An untimely petition in either case does not meet
the statutory exceptions to the one-year filing period.
In order to provide a remedy230 for a violation of a defendant's
"enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel, 2 31 ineffectiveness of
PCRA counsel should be considered an extraordinary circumstance
permitting the late filing of a second or subsequent petition nunc pro tunc.
Moreover, the second petition should be treated as a first petition under the
rationale of Commonwealth v. Lewis.232 In Lewis, the Court held that where
a first petition merely results in reinstating the defendant's right to direct
appeal lost because of counsel's ineffectiveness, the second petition is
considered the first petition because the initial petition does not result in the
defendant receiving post-conviction relief.233 Like the defendant in Lewis, a
defendant who does not receive effective representation in the PCRA court
225. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 699.
226. Id. at 700 (holding that a counsel appointed pursuant to Rule 1505 is held to the same
standard as a counsel appointed pursuant to a constitutional mandate).
227. See Commonwealth v. Green, 709 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1998) (holding that counsel is not
precluded from raising his or her own effectiveness on appeal); Commonwealth v. McBee, 520
A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1986) (holding the case should be remanded for the appointment of new counsel
unless it is either clear from the record that counsel was ineffective or the claim was meritless).
228. Although the Act is silent on the issue, assuming that the filing of a petition tolls the
running of the one-year filing period, the period would begin to run again following the
expiration of the time for appeal or the time to petition for allowance of appeal. If PCRA
counsel was ineffective in the trial court or on appeal, it is unlikely that an indigent incarcerated
defendant will recognize counsel's ineffectiveness and file a second petition during the remaining
one-year period.
229. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 1504(d) which provides that appointment of counsel is effective
throughout post-conviction proceedings, including any appeal from the disposition of the
petition.
230. See Priovolos, 715 A.2d at 422 (holding that "a remedy may be fashioned when counsel
fails to [perform effectively]").
231. See Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 700.
232. 718 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 1998).
233. See id.
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or on an appeal, does not receive post-conviction review, let alone relief.
Treating a second and untimely PCRA petition as a timely first petition is the
only way to give meaning to a defendant's right to effective post-conviction
counsel.
B. Illegal Sentences and the One- Year Filing Period
The Court's holding in Fahy that a challenge to the legality of a
sentence 234 is time barred if not raised in a PCRA petition within the one-
year filing period,235 is in conflict with decisions holding that challenges to the
legality of a sentence cannot be waived236 and provide a basis for post-
conviction relief even though the defendant did not take a direct appeal
following imposition of sentence. 237 The principle underlying the non-
waivability of an illegal sentence claim is that courts are empowered to
correct an illegal sentence238 pursuant to the well-established principle that
"under our constitution [courts] have certain inherent rights and powers to
do all such things as are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice." 239 A court's power to correct an illegal sentence is not limited by the
statutory provision 240 that strips a court of authority to alter or amend a
sentence thirty days after entry of a sentence.241 The "inherent power of the
court '242 to correct an illegal sentence "is not eliminated by the expiration of
the thirty-day appeal period. '243  The non-waivable nature of an illegal
sentence claim permits a sentencing court to "correct an illegal sentence ...
at anytime" 244 and the issue may be "the subject of inquiry by an appellate
court sua sponte."245 Such claims can be reviewed at any time because a court
has no authority to impose a sentence in violation of the law.246 In holding
that illegal sentence claims are time barred if not presented within the one
year filing period, the Court in Fahy ignores settled precedent and
undermines the basic responsibility of the judiciary to do "such things...
234. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545 (b)(1)(West 1998).
235. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 218.
236. See Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. 1983) (stating that a "challenge
to a sentence which is unlawful per se is not waived where it is raised for first time on appeal");
Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 A.2d 614, 618 (Pa. Super. 1995); Commonwealth v. Pastorkovic,
567 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that " 'illegality' of sentence is nonwaivable issue
and... may be the subject of inquiry by an appellate court sua sponte").
237. See Commonwealth v. Shannon, 608 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lehr, 583
A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 1990); Commonwealth v. Perdue, 564 A.2d 489 (Pa. Super. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 465 A.2d 1284, corrected, 483 A.2d 1389 (Pa. Super. 1983).
238. See Jones, 554 A.2d at 52.
239. Sweet v. Pa. Labor R.B., County of Washington, 322 A.2d 362,365 (Pa. 1974).
240. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5505 (West 1998) (repealed).
241. See Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super. 1994).
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1291 n. 6 (Pa. 1983).
245. Pastorkovic, 567 A.2d at 1091. See also Commonwealth v. Ford, 461 A.2d 1281, 1289 (Pa.
Super. 1983).
246. See Jones, 554 A.2d at 52.
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necessary for the administration of justice. 247
C. State Habeas Corpus and the PCRA's One- Year Filing Period
The relationship between habeas corpus guaranteed by Article I, Section
14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 248 and the PCRA has been considered by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in several recent cases.249 The issue arose
where post-conviction relief has not been sought within the required one-
year time period.250 In these cases, defendants argued that if they do not
have a remedy under the PCRA, the Court should treat their claims for
collateral relief as a request for habeas corpus.251 In other cases, defendants
have argued that if the PCRA does not apply to certain claims, courts have
authority to grant habeas corpus relief or relief nunc pro tunc.25 2
Pennsylvania has had a habeas corpus statute since 1785,253 and the right
has been constitutionally guaranteed in Pennsylvania since 1790.2  4 In an
early decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the common law
writ of habeas corpus, described by the Court as "much broader [in] scope,"
existed alongside the form of the writ secured by statute.25 5 In another early
decision, the Superior Court referred to the common law form of the writ as
an "implied common law power, not created by the habeas corpus act.., but
existing both before and since the passage of [the] act .... 256 Common law
habeas corpus gradually evolved from a remedy to correct illegal sentences to
providing defendants the means to collaterally challenge convictions where
fundamental error occurred at trial.257 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
specifically addressed the relationship between the two forms of habeas
corpus in a decision just prior to the enactment of the PCHA holding that
statutory habeas had "no application .... ,,28 Rather, such claims, the court
held, were to be considered under the common law form of the writ "which
247. Sweet, 322 A.2d at 365.
248. The writ of habeas corpus is codified at 42 Pa. Consol. State. §§ 6501-6505 (West 1998).
249. Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d
214 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998).
250. See e.g. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 639; Chester, 733 A.2d at 1251; Fahy, 737 A.2d at 233-34.
251. See e.g. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 640; Fahy, 737 A.2d at 223.
252. See e.g. Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 568; Chester, 733 A.2d at 1248.
253. See Act of Feb. 18, 1785, 2 Sm. L. 275.
254. See Thomas Raeburn White, Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania 112
(1907).
255. Williamson v. Lewis, 39 Pa. 9, 29 (1861). See also Fair, 146 A.2d at 843 ("The common
law writ is even more extensive in its scope than that authorized by the Habeas Corpus
Act .... 1.
256. Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 9 Pa. Super. 527, 533 (1899), aff d, sub nom. In re Kelly, 50
A. 248 (Pa. 1901). For a summary of early decisions discussing the relationship between the
common law and statutory forms of habeas corpus, see William R. Klaus, The Pennsylvania
Habeas Corpus Act of 1951, 26 Temp. L.Q. 32 (1952-53).
257. For an overview of the history of habeas corpus in Pennsylvania, see Elizabeth L. Green,
Student Author, Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post Conviction Hearing Act, 39 Temp. L.Q. 188,
190-93 (1966).
258. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613, 623 (Pa. 1965).
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has a much broader scope"25 9 than statutory habeas corpus. The court noted
that because the common law form of the writ was not "frozen into [the
habeas corpus] statute" it is "moldable to the exigencies of the times. ... "260
In enacting the PCHA, 261 the predecessor of the current PCRA, the
legislature provided that the post-conviction procedures under the PCHA
"shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures... including
habeas corpus .. ,,262 In construing this provision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court described the remedies under the PCHA as "derivative" of
those under habeas corpus and noted that the writ of habeas corpus "was
always available in the lower courts. '263 In another decision, the Court held
that the PCRA did not "abolish the common law remedy of habeas corpus"
and that "[a]ll claims previously cognizable on a common law writ, in
circumstances not covered by the terms of the PCRA, may be litigated by
means of the common law writ. '264
Following the enactment of the PCHA, the legislature amended the
habeas corpus statute to provide that habeas corpus relief was not available if
"a remedy may be had by post conviction hearing proceedings .... -265 When
the PCHA was amended and renamed the PCRA in 1988, the PCRA again
specifically addressed the status of habeas corpus. Section 9542 of the PCRA
provides that the remedy under the PCRA "shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies.., including habeas corpus.'"26 6  Prior to the 1995
amendments, in the few cases where defendants sought post-conviction relief
in the form of habeas corpus, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of
habeas corpus relief holding that the issues raised "could have been
considered ... in the regular course of appellate review or by post conviction
proceedings" 267 and, therefore, relief was not available under the "statutory
remedy" 268 of habeas corpus. Because post-conviction relief prior to 1995
was not subject to a time-for-filing requirement, the issue of whether habeas




261. See Act of Jan. 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, 19 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 1180-1 - 1180-14,
recodified, 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. §§ 9541-9551 (repealed 1988).
262. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9542 (repealed 1988).
263. Commonwealth v. Lesko, 501 A.2d 200, 204 (Pa. 1985).
264. Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1971).
265. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 6503(b) (West 1990).
266. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9542 (West 1998).
267. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 665 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 605 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. 1992).
268. Id. at 1273.
269. The PCRA did not impose a time limit on filing for post-conviction relief.
Commonwealth v. Weddington, 522 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. 1987) (dismissal of petition solely on
basis of delay was improper as legislature left period for obtaining PCHA relief unbounded).
Under the PCRA, prior to the 1995 Amendments, a court, pursuant to § 9543(b), could dismiss a
petition if, because of delay in the filing of the petition the prosecution had been prejudicial in its
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The enactment of the 1995 amendments to the post-conviction relief
required for the first time that a post-conviction relief petition be filed within
a year of the date the petitioner's judgment becomes final.270  A post-
conviction relief could now be denied as time barred; the question of whether
a defendant was likewise barred from seeking habeas corpus relief was
addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Peterkin.2 1  Peterkin
involved a second post-conviction relief petition seeking both collateral and
habeas corpus relief filed ten years after defendant's conviction of two counts
of first-degree murder became final. On appeal from dismissal of the petition
as premature because of the pendency of litigation in federal court, the
Commonwealth argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the
petition because it was not timely filed. On the basis of the dual status of his
petition, Peterkin asserted that because habeas corpus is constitutionally
guaranteed, habeas corpus is not limited by the PCRA and the PCRA's time-
for-filing provision unconstitutionally limited his right to habeas corpus
relief. 272 In affirming the dismissal of the petition as untimely under the
PCRA, the Court initially concluded, as noted earlier, that the one-year filing
period is jurisdictional. Holding that the writ of habeas corpus continues to
exist "only in cases in which there is no remedy under the PCRA ,' 273 the
Court concluded that Peterkin's claims were cognizable under the PCRA
and, therefore, even though the claims were time barred, habeas corpus was
not available as a remedy.274 With respect to Peterkin's argument that the
time-for-filing provision of the PCRA acts as a suspension of the
constitutional right to habeas corpus review, the Court noted that the instant
petition was his second petition.2 75 Because he had access to habeas corpus
relief through his first PCRA petition, his suspension claim was without
merit.2 76 Finally, the Court rejected Peterkin's argument that the time-for-
filing provision of the PCRA unconstitutionally limits his right to habeas
corpus relief.277  Holding that the legislature may impose reasonable
restrictions on constitutional rights without violating the right in question, the
Court relied upon its 1879 holding in Sayres v. Commonwealth278 that upheld
the constitutionality of a statute that required defendants to seek a writ of
error within twenty days of sentence.279 The Court in Peterkin concluded that
because the one-year filing period under the PCRA was "sufficiently
generous" to permit preparation of even complex cases and because the
ability to respond to the petition or in its ability to retry the defendant if relief was otherwise
available to the defendant. See e.g. Commonwealth v. McGriff, 638 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Weinder, 577 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Super. 1990).
270. See 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 9545(b) (West 1998).
271. See Peterken, 722 A.2d at 639.
272. See id. at 641.
273. Id. at 640.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 641.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 88 Pa. 291 (1879).
279. See Peterkin, 772 A.2d at 642.
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statute provided exceptions to the required filing period, the time limits in
the PCRA did not "unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit [the]
constitutional right to habeas corpus relief."280
While Peterkin was not the ideal case to claim that the time-for-filing
provision of the PCRA unconstitutionally suspends or limits habeas corpus
review because the issue was presented in the context of a second petition, it
is clear the Court would have reached the same conclusion if Peterkin had
appealed from the dismissal of an untimely filed first PCRA petition without
regard to why the petition was not timely filed.281 Noting that with the
enactment of the 1995 amendments, the legislature established a scheme in
which "PCRA petitions are to be accorded finality," the Court held that a
defendant does not have a post-conviction remedy for claims that are
cognizable under the PCRA if a PCRA petition is not timely filed.282 That a
court has no jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition does not, the Court
held, unconstitutionally limit or suspend habeas corpus relief. 2 3
Several aspects of the Peterkin decision merit comment. First, in relying
on Sayres for its holding that the time limits under the PCRA do not
unconstitutionally suspend habeas corpus, the Court in Peterkin disregarded
a significant difference between the time-for-filing requirement under the
PCRA and the statute in question in Sayres. In Peterkin, the Court stated
that the one-year filing period under the PCRA is jurisdictional and not
subject to equitable tolling.284 However, the statute in Sayres was a statute of
limitations, and the crux of the Court's holding was that any time limit must
be reasonable.25
That the Court in Sayres had authority to consider an untimely writ
supports the argument that as a limit on the court's jurisdiction, the one-year
filing period under the PCRA unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas
corpus. Time limitations are not "reasonable restrictions" 286 on a defendant's
right to habeas corpus relief if a court is without power to consider an
untimely post-conviction petition where the defendant asserts that
extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file the petition on time. 287
Because a court under Peterkin has no power to consider an untimely
petition, in enacting the time-for-filing provision in the PCRA, the legislature
has "so hampered" the right to habeas corpus "as to amount to a practical
deprivation" of the right.2
280. Id. at 643.
281. See id. at 642. Peterkin did not meet any of the exceptions to the one-year filing
requirement. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 643.
284. Id. at 641.
285. See Sayres, 88 Pa. at 309.
286. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 642.
287. See Commonwealth v. Weddington, 522 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. 1987) (reversing dismissal of
PCHA petition as untimely but noting in dictum that time limitations on the filing for post-
conviction relief "would be workable in this Commonwealth so long as due process is served by
writs such as habeas corpus and coram nobis").
288. Commonwealth v. Reifsteck, 115 A. 130, 132 (Pa. 1921).
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Second, while the decision in Peterkin holds that the PCRA subsumes
the remedy of habeas corpus where relief is available under the PCRA, there
is no discussion in Peterkin of the long history of common law habeas corpus
and the role of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in shaping the writ.89 Nor is
there a discussion of the issue in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn,29° a pre-Peterkin
decision holding that unlike the PCHA, the PCRA "supersedes '291 the
common law writ of habeas corpus. As noted, prior decisions have held that
common law habeas corpus is "an implied common-law power" 292 not created
by the habeas corpus statute, and that the Court had the authority to
"mould '293 habeas corpus to address the "exigencies" 294 of any particular
case 295 and the "power to delineate the conditions under which [the] writ of
habeas corpus can be used in challenging criminal convictions."'296 If Peterkin
and Ahlborn mean that courts have no authority, outside that conferred by
the legislature, to grant habeas corpus relief where, for example, exceptional
circumstances prevent a defendant from filing a timely post-conviction
petition, the court has significantly altered the historical role Pennsylvania
courts have played in "[continuing] to make ... the protections [of habeas
corpus] available. ''297
Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, the Court in Peterkin makes no
reference to how the federal courts have ruled in cases where the one-year
filing period governing federal habeas corpus has been challenged as
unconstitutionally suspending habeas corpus. Like Pennsylvania, Congress
in 1996 enacted a one-year limitation period on the filing of petitions seeking
federal habeas corpus relief.29 To date, circuit courts that have specifically
addressed the issue have held that because the one-year limitation period
acts as a statute of limitation subject to equitable tolling, the one-year
limitation does not render the habeas corpus remedy "inadequate or
ineffective" 299 and, therefore, the time-for-filing requirement does not
289. Peterkin refers only the statutory form of the writ. In Peterkin, the Court responded to
the claim that because of the continued existence of the habeas corpus statute after the PCRA
was enacted, an action for habeas corpus relief is not limited by the PCRA. The court stated
that it "agree[d] that the legislature intended that the writ would continue to exist as a separate
remedy. However, as the statute itself provides, the writ continues to exist only in cases in which
there is no remedy under the PCRA." Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 640.
290. 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1997). In Ahlborn, the court held that the defendant was not entitled
to PCRA relief because he had finished serving the sentence imposed before the court
adjudicated the issues presented in his petition.
291. Id. at 721.
292. Gibbons, 9 Pa. Super. at 533, affd sub nom., In re Kelly, 50 A. 248; Fair, 146 A.2d at 846.
293. Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520, 524 (1859); Myers, 213 A.2d at 623.
294. Myers, 213 A.2d at 623.
295. Id. at 622.
296. Id.
297. Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 485 (Pa. 1969) (Roberts, J., concurring).
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1999).
299. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (stating that "substitution of a collateral
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention
does not constitute suspension of the writ of habeas corpus"); Rosa v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ.
2468(RWS), 1997 WL 436484 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1997); 1997 WL 436484 (S.D.N.Y. Nov 17,
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suspend the writ.3 ° Because the federal and Pennsylvania constitutional
provisions are identical, the federal cases lend strong support to the
argument that because the Pennsylvania time for filing provision is a
"jurisdictional law not subject to equitable tolling, '30 1 Pennsylvania's one-
year filing period unreasonably limits the availability of the writ in violation
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 2
CONCLUSION
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decisions have
expanded the scope of the PCRA, the Court has also limited collateral relief
by construing the time-for-filing provision of the Act as jurisdictional3 3 and
holding that habeas corpus relief is not available if the claim could have been
presented in a PCRA petition.3°u The Court's decision in Kimball broadens
the availability of post-conviction relief by rejecting an interpretation of the
PCRA as requiring a defendant seeking collateral relief on grounds of
ineffectiveness to meet a more demanding prejudice standard than governs
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. 35 In holding that there is a unitary
standard governing the review of ineffectiveness claims, Kimball equates a
defendant's showing that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel's actions with the conclusion that the proceeding
resulted in an unreliable adjudication of guilt. The conclusion is at odds with
post-Strickland United States Supreme Court decisions holding that, with
respect to certain types of lawyer error, the proceeding is reliable even
though the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the
lawyer's conduct. As a result, the standard for evaluating claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel in Pennsylvania is arguably less demanding than
the Strickland standard. 3°6 Thus, it is in conflict with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's conclusion in Pierce that the Pennsylvania standard for
ineffectiveness claims is identical to the standard set forth in Strickland.307
The Court further expanded relief under the PCRA by holding that
counsel's performance on direct appeal is cognizable under the Act and that
a defendant has an enforceable right to effective counsel in a first PCRA
proceeding. 308 Both decisions lend support to the argument that a defendant
1997).
300. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390,
392 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Rodriguez v. Artuz, 990 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd, 161
F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1998). But see Rosa v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ. 2468, 1997 WL 436484 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) opinion modified, 1997 WL 724559 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd on other grounds, 148 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 1998).
301. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222.
302. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 14.
303. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222.
304. See Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 641.
305. See Kimball, 724 A.2d at 332.
306. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
307. See Pierce, 527 A.2d at 976.
308. See Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638.
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is entitled to a PCRA remedy where counsel's ineffectiveness causes a
defendant to lose the right to discretionary review. The need for a state court
remedy has been made more compelling by the Supreme Court's recent
decision holding that a defendant must exhaust all state court avenues of
relief before seeking federal habeas corpus review. 3°9
While the Court has expanded the type of claims that can be raised in a
PCRA proceeding by interpreting the PCRA's one-year time-for-filing
requirement as jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling, it has
significantly limited the availability of collateral relief.310  Neither the
language, structure, nor legislative history of the 1995 amendments to the
PCRA suggest that the legislature intended the filing period to act as a
jurisdictional bar. Such a construction of the filing period is inconsistent with
the fact that the PCRA places responsibility upon incarcerated, indigent
defendants to prepare and timely file petitions seeking post-conviction relief.
Even as a limit on a court's jurisdiction, the one-year filing period should be
excused under the nunc pro tunc doctrine where extraordinary circumstances
prevent incarcerated defendants from complying with the filing period.
Finally, the Court's holding in Peterkin that the one-year time-for-filing
provision does not unconstitutionally suspend habeas corpus31' finds no
support in the Court's prior habeas corpus decisions or case law construing
legislative restrictions on constitutionally guaranteed rights. Because a court
does not have authority to consider the reasons that made it impossible for a
defendant to file a timely petition, the PCRA's time-for-filing provision
unconstitutionally restricts habeas corpus relief.
309. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). This issue may be moot in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent order issued after this article was prepared for publication,
declaring that a defendant is not required to seek allowance of appeal in order to be deemed to
have exhausted all available state remedies for purposes of federal habeas corpus review. In re
Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial
Admin. Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9,2000).
310. See supra nn. 290-91.
311. See Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643.
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